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Abstract 
The issue in solving social problems is how to respect minority opinions, which are often ignored in 
general majority rules. To build consensus on pluralistic values and make social choices in 
consideration of minority opinions, we propose aggregation methods that give weighting to the 
minority's positionality on cardinal cumulative voting. Based on quadratic and linear voting, we 
formulated three weighted aggregation methods that differ in the ratio of votes to cumulative points 
and the weighting of the minority to all members, and calculated the frequency distributions of the 
aggregation results, assuming that the distributions of votes follow normal distributions. From these 
calculation results, we found that minority opinions are likely to be reflected as weighting increases 
proportionally in two of the above three methods. This means that Sen and Gotoh's idea of considering 
the social position of unfortunate people on ordinal ranking, that welfare economics considers under 
an axiomatic approach, was shown by weighting the minority's positionality on cardinal voting. In 
addition, we can know the contents such as the number and positionality of the minority from the 
analysis of the aggregation results. It will be useful for promoting mutual understanding between the 
majority and minority by visualizing the contents of the proposed aggregation methods interactively 
in the consensus-building process. With the further development of information technology, the 
consensus building on cardinal choices based on big data will be necessary. We would like to use the 
proposed aggregation methods for making social choices for pluralistic values such as social, 
environmental, and economic. 
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1. Introduction 
Disparities in wealth, inequalities in income, environmental pollution, and cultural collapse etc. have 
become social problems in various countries, regions, and communities. To solve these social 
problems, it is necessary to consider not only economic values but also pluralistic values related to 
humans, society, environment, and culture (e.g. Epstein & Buhovac, 2014). To solve social problems 
and aim for a sustainable and fair society, it is necessary to make social choices while building 
consensus among stakeholders with diverse values. The consensus-building process typically 
involves voting on and aggregating diverse opinions. 
The fundamental challenge with voting methods is how to make appropriate collective decisions. 
However, due to Condorcet's paradox and Arrow's impossibility theorem, it is theoretically and 
practically difficult to aggregate various opinions. Various voting methods have been devised by 
mathematicians, political scientists, economists, etc., such as majority rule, score voting by Borda 
count, and cumulative voting by number of points. However, which criteria should be used to compare 
voting methods and which voting method should be preferred are also issues (e.g. Pacuit, 2019; Sakai, 
2013). 
Quadratic voting, which was recently developed, is a variant of cardinal cumulative voting (Lally & 
Weyl, 2018; Posner & Weyl, 2018). In quadratic voting, the voter uses points evenly distributed to 
voters to express the degree of preference, and the points are cumulatively assigned to a strongly 
favored choice. The term ‘quadratic’ means the number of votes that can be purchased is a quadratic 
function of the number of points according to the economic pricing rule (the details are omitted, but 
briefly, the voter should pay the cost to change the cardinal choice because the change boosts the 
marginal cost of all members). 
Practical opinion surveys have shown that quadratic voting-based surveys can more clearly measure 
respondent preferences than the de facto standard Likert survey (Quarfoot et al., 2017). In the Likert 
survey, there is a problem that the aggregated results of responses for a discrete index axis (for 
example, 7th quantile) have a W-shaped frequency distribution that is extremely biased. In a survey 
based on quadratic voting, however, the aggregation result becomes a bell-shaped quasi-normal 
distribution for a more subdivided and substantially continuous index axis (for example, 20th 
quantile). The aggregation result is considered to be close to the true distribution of respondent 
preferences. 
There is a discussion on justice and equality in welfare economics, that is a branch of economics to 
evaluate social welfare, as another perspective that is different from the accuracy of opinion surveys. 
In Rawls' theory of justice, “original position", in which the peculiarity of an individual is obscured 
by a "veil of ignorance", is the premise for making a fair social choice. On the other hand, Sen's idea 
of justice extends Rawls' theory by giving asymmetric weights to the "social position” of unfortunate 
people due to race, gender, disability, etc. In addition, the position parameters are reflexively and 
continuously updated through "trans-positional assessment" (Sen, 2002). 
A position-conscious selection procedure has been proposed as a social-choice method that reflects 
Sen's position idea (Gotoh, 2015; Gotoh, 2017). In this procedure, priority is given to the ordinal 
selection ranking of a victim group in unfortunate positions for specific values (priority condition), 
the matching ranking among victim groups is defined as the social ranking (group Pareto condition), 
and the other group's selection ranking regarding other values does not interfere (refrain condition). 
This selection procedure , by an unexpected case or an appearance of new victims, will be corrected 
in the consensus-building process. 
Based on the above, the advantage of cardinal cumulative voting, including quadratic voting, is that 
the aggregate results close to the true opinion distribution of voters who are stakeholders can be 
obtained. Also, based on the analysis of voting data, the votes of voters with strong preference 
including the minority can be extracted from the comparison of the back-calculation result to 1p1v (1 
person 1 vote) and the cumulative voting result. Moreover, the aggregation results can be changed by 
weighting considering the minority's position based on the idea of Sen and Gotoh. Although it is not 
possible to determine the social position of the minority from only the voting data, the weight is given 
to voting on the position of the cardinal value (positionality) supported by the minority. 
Our aim is to present a consensus-building process for making social choices that reflect the opinions 
of the minority, e.g., unfortunate people. To achieve this aim, we propose aggregation methods that 
give weighting to the minority's positionality by incorporating the idea of the position-conscious 
procedure of Sen and Gotoh into the cumulative voting. To investigate the properties of these methods, 
assuming a normal distribution as the true opinion distribution of voters, quadratic and ordinary point 
voting (so-called linear voting) are then used as cumulative voting methods for pluralistic values. We 
discuss how the aggregation results change depending on the aggregation methods that give weighting 
to the minority's positionality. Specifically, we formulate our aggregation methods in Chapter 2, 
present the aggregation results in Chapter 3, discuss these methods' characteristics and use in the 
consensus-building process in Chapter 4, and conclude the paper in Chapter 5. 
2. Proposed Aggregation Methods 
We formulate our aggregation methods that give weighting to the minority's positionality on cardinal 
cumulative voting. It is assumed that the majority votes are evenly distributed for pluralistic values, 
the minority cumulatively votes for a particular monistic value, the frequency distributions of the 
aggregation results of the majority and minority follow normal distributions, and both distributions 
have a reproductive property (composition and decomposition) between them. Figure 1 shows the 
raw frequency distribution of the weighted aggregation result of cumulative voting for a certain 
monistic value (black line), the original frequency distribution (similar to 1p1v conversion) of all 
members obtained by analyzing the raw frequency distribution (green line), the individual original 
frequency distributions of the majority and minority obtained by decomposing the original frequency 
distribution of all members (blue and orange lines), and the frequency distribution of the minority by 
weighting the minority's positionality (dark-red line). In Fig. 1, the black-line distribution is 
composed of the blue-line distribution, the orange-line distribution (right side), and the dark-red-line 
distribution (left side). The formulation conditions are listed in itemized form below. 
・ 𝑛 members distribute their votes for 𝑘-dimensional pluralistic values. 
・ The original frequency distribution of all members 𝑛 with ‘1 person same vote’ (similar to 
1p1v) for a certain one-dimensional coordinate follows the normal distribution 𝑁(𝜇𝑜,  𝜎𝑜
2). 
・ Points 𝑝 per person are distributed for cumulative voting. 
・ The number of minority voters with strong preference is 𝑚 out of 𝑛 , and the number of 
majority voters with weak preference is 𝑛 − 𝑚. 
・ Each of the majority voters votes 𝑎 for a certain one dimension by evenly distributing the 𝑝 
for 𝑘 dimensions, and its distribution follows the original normal distribution 𝑁(𝜇𝑜,  𝜎𝑜
2). 
・ Each of the minority voters votes b by cumulatively concentrating the 𝑝 for a certain one 
dimension, and its distribution follows the normal distribution 𝑁(𝜇𝑚 ,  𝜎𝑚
2). 
・ Positionality weight 𝑤𝑝 is given to the minority. However, when 𝑘 = 1, there is no difference 
in the number of votes between the majority and minority (𝑎 = 𝑏), and the minority cannot be 
recognized, so 𝑤𝑝 = 1. 
・ The distribution of the positionality-weighted aggregation that combines the distributions of 
the majority and minority is 𝑁(𝜇,  𝜎2). 
・ For convenience of calculation, the distribution 𝑁(2𝜇𝑜 − 𝜇𝑚 ,  𝜎𝑚2) of the mirror image of the 
minority 𝑚 is assumed. 
 
Figure 1. Frequency distributions of all members; majority and minority 
Under these conditions, the mean 𝜇  of the distribution 𝑁(𝜇,  𝜎2)  (black line in Fig. 1) of the 
positionality-weighted aggregation is calculated from the weighted mean of the combination of the 
distributions (blue, dark-red, and orange lines on the right side in Fig. 1) and is expressed with the 
following equation. 
𝜇 =
𝑎(𝑛 − 2𝑚)𝜇𝑜 + 𝑎𝑚(2𝜇𝑜 − 𝜇𝑚) + 𝑏𝑚𝑤𝑝𝜇𝑚
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(1) 
The maximum number of the minority voters at 𝜇𝑚 in the original frequency distribution (green line 
in Fig. 1) is calculated from the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution (the gray-
shaded area in Fig. 1), as shown in Eq. (2). 
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(2) 
In Eqs. (1) and (2), the five methods, i.e., quadratic-non-weighted (Q-NW), quadratic-square-root 
weighted (Q-SW), quadratic-linear weighted (Q-LW), linear-linear weighted (L-LW), and linear-non-
weighted (L-NW), are formulated as shown in Table 1 by changing 𝑎 and 𝑏 in cumulative voting 
and 𝑤𝑝 in aggregation. Quadratic and linear voting are assumed as the cumulative voting methods, 
and the majority/minority ratio 𝑛 𝑚⁄  and its square root √𝑛 𝑚⁄  are assumed as weights. Q-NW is a 
usual quadratic voting method, L-NW is a usual linear voting method, and Q-SW, Q-LW, and L-LW 
are new proposed methods. 
 
Table 1. Usual and proposed aggregation methods 
 
The ratio of the mean 𝜇 of the aggregation to the mean  of the original normal distribution 𝜇𝑜 
(𝜇 𝜇𝑜⁄ ) for Q-NW, Q-SW, Q-LW, L-LW, and L-NW, is calculated using Eqs. (3) to (7), respectively. 
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(7) 
As shown in Eq. (1), the 𝜇 depends on the ratio of minority votes to majority votes 𝑏 𝑎⁄ . Therefore, 
the number of 𝑝 does not appear in Eqs. (3) to (7). In other words, 𝜇 does not depend on the number 
𝑝 and is determined by whether the votes are evenly distributed or cumulatively concentrated on the 
𝑘-dimensional value coordinates. 
3. Calculation Results 
Figure 2 is a set of five graphs showing the calculation results of Q-NW, Q-SW, Q-LW, L-LW, and 
L-NW by using Eqs. (3) to (7). The horizontal axes of the five graphs represent the ratio 𝜇𝑚 𝜇𝑜⁄ , and 
the vertical axes represent the ratio 𝜇 𝜇𝑜⁄ . Since 𝜇 𝜇𝑜⁄  is calculated from 𝑚 𝑛⁄  shown in Eq. (2), 
𝜇𝑚 < 𝜇𝑜 represents the minimum possible value, and 𝜇𝑚 ≥ 𝜇𝑜 represents the maximum possible 
value. 
In each graph of Fig. 2, the nine lines are drawn using 3 × 3 parameters using the ratio of the 
standard deviation 𝜎𝑜 to 𝜇𝑜 (𝜎𝑜 𝜇𝑜⁄ = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8) and 𝑘 (𝑘 = 1, 3, 5). However, when 𝑘 = 1, the 
numbers of votes of the majority and minority are equal (𝑎 = 𝑏), the minority is not weighted (𝑤𝑝 =
1), and 𝜇 𝜇𝑜⁄  is always 1, so the calculation results show that three lines (𝜎𝑜 𝜇𝑜⁄ = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 at 𝑘 =
1 ) overlap. The diagonal light-gray line in each graph is a hypothetical case in which 𝜇𝑚  is 
completely in agreement with 𝜇, and that the opinions of the minority are more likely reflected as the 
calculation results become closer to this light-gray line. Figure 3 is a graph comparing the calculation 
results of Q-NW, Q-SW, Q-LW, L-LW, and L-NW when 𝜎𝑜 𝜇𝑜⁄ = 0.5 and 𝑘 = 3. The horizontal and 
vertical axes and diagonal light-gray line are the same as those in in Fig. 2. The horizontal light-gray 
line shows the case of 𝜇 𝜇𝑜⁄ = 1 for reference. 
Figure 2. Calculation results of Q-NW, Q-SW, Q-LW, L-LW, and L-NW 
Figure 3. Comparison of Q-NW, Q-SW, Q-LW, L-LW, and L-NW 
The calculation results in Figs. 2 and 3 generally show that the larger the 𝜎𝑜 𝜇𝑜⁄  (the more the 
opinions of the majority spread in a certain one dimension), or the larger the 𝑘 (the more the opinions 
of the majority are distributed in many dimensions), the more the opinions of the minority are 
reflected. As a matter of course, Q-NW, Q-SW, Q-LW, L-LW, and L-NW have 𝜇 = 𝜇𝑚 in the limit 
of 𝑘 → ∞ (approaching asymptotically to the diagonal light-gray lines in Figs. 2 and 3). 
Comparing the calculation results of Q-NW and L-NW that do not give weighting to the minority's 
positionality, the 𝜇 𝜇𝑜⁄  of Q-NW depends on 𝑏 𝑎⁄ = √𝑘, and the 𝜇 𝜇𝑜⁄  of L-NW depends on 𝑏 𝑎⁄ =
𝑘, so the minority opinion is reflected in L-NW rather than Q-NW. 
In a bilateral comparison of Q-NW and Q-SW or L-NW and L-LW, the minority opinions in the latter , 
which give weighting to the positionality of the minority, are more likely to be reflected than in the 
former, which does not give weighting to the positionality of the minority. Comparing the weighted 
Q-SW, Q-LW, and L-LW, the minority opinions are more likely to be reflected in the order Q-SW, Q-
LW, and L-LW as 𝑏 𝑎⁄ = √𝑘~𝑘 and 𝑤𝑝 = √𝑛 𝑚⁄ ~ 𝑛 𝑚⁄  increase. 
In Q-NW, Q-SW, and L-NW, the shape of the graphs is a wave, so if 𝜇𝑚 is too far from 𝜇𝑜 (𝜇𝑚 𝜇𝑜⁄  
is too far from the centered value 1), it will be difficult to reflect the opinion of the minority. In Q-
LW and L-LW, since the shape of the graphs is linear, the opinions of the minority are reflected 
proportionally. 
Note that Q-LW and L-LW have less dependence on 𝜎𝑜 𝜇𝑜⁄  than the other methods. This means that 
the minority opinions are reflected regardless of the concentration degree of the majority opinions. In 
Eqs. (5) and (6) for Q-LW and L-LW, 𝑘 and 𝑚 𝑛⁄  are in same parentheses. This is because when 𝑚 
is small, 𝑘 becomes dominant in the parentheses, that is, 𝜎𝑜 𝜇𝑜⁄  in Eq. (2) becomes ineffective. 
4. Discussion 
By adopting the new aggregation methods (Q-SW, Q-LW, L-LW) that give weighting to the minority's 
positionality on cumulative voting for pluralistic values, we found that these methods enable social 
choices to reflect the opinions of the minority compared to the usual cumulative voting methods (Q-
NW, L-NW). Of the three positionality-weighted aggregation methods, we found that Q-LW and L-
LW, which were given weighting by the linear ratio of the majority to the minority, could reflect the 
opinions proportionally even when the number of minority voters decreased. These results indicate 
that Sen and Gotoh's idea of giving priority on ordinal ranking to unfortunate people in the position-
conscious selection procedure considering the positionality of the minority on cardinal cumulative 
voting. 
With the cardinal cumulative voting methods, the existence of a minority can be extracted from the 
analysis of voting data, but as described in Chapter 1, it is not possible to determine the social position 
such as based on a specific social hierarchy, victimhood, disability, race, and culture. We believe that 
which of the aggregation methods (including their further deformation methods) should be adopted 
should be selected according to social issues and positions. For example, in the dimension related to 
economic value, Q-NW, originally derived from an economic perspective, will be adopted, and in the 
dimension related to environmental value, Q-SW or Q-LW will be adopted to balance with economic 
value considering the opinion of the minority. In the dimensions related to social and human values, 
it will be possible to adopt Q-LW or L-LW, which reflect the opinions of the minority proportionally. 
One application in the real world is the choice of operational measures with the three representative 
values of social (regional economic circulation rate, that is, regional revitalization), environmental 
(natural energy usage rate), and economic (energy cost) in the local community (Hiroi, 2009; Edahiro, 
2018). Another application is the choice of management method regarding social value (transfer to 
descendants and others), environmental value (distribution of natural resources), and economic value 
(distribution of profits) in a mutual aid community (Najita, 2009). All these are cases in which social 
choices are made from cardinal alternatives for pluralistic values. As information technology 
permeates throughout the real world, there will be more cases in which consensus building for 
pluralistic and cardinal alternatives is needed based on big-data analysis in addition to the ordering 
and selection of ordinal or discrete alternatives. 
The proposed aggregation methods that give weighting to the minority's positionality can be used 
interactively in the process of consensus building among stakeholders with diverse values, instead of 
immediately determining the choice of the cardinal value based on the aggregation results. By 
visualizing the aggregation results and providing them to stakeholders in the process of consensus 
building, it seems that the majority and minority can deepen their discussions by taking the other's 
position into account. Examples of visualization include the opinion position and number of minority 
voters, original distribution that is back-calculated to 1p1v (without weighting), original distributions 
of the majority and minority that decomposed the original distribution, strength of minority opinions 
that is the cumulative voting result, and aggregation result that gives weighting to the minority's 
positionality. Moreover, by presenting information of not only one dimension but also other 
dimensions in the consensus-building process, mutual coordination and compromise between 
dimensions can be facilitated. 
Although our calculation results were regarding the case in which there is one minority in a certain 
dimension, when there is a conflict between minorities in the same dimension, there is no choice but 
to solve it in the consensus-building process by visualizing and recognizing the existence of each 
minority. Note that our results were calculated from the maximum number of minority voters in the 
original frequency distribution, as described above regarding Eq. (2). Social issues with extremely 
few minority voters should be treated as individual issues rather than through cumulative voting. 
It should be noted that, as well as the usual cumulative voting method, the proposed aggregation 
methods will satisfy the conditions of anonymity, neutrality, and universality of domain. Similar to 
Sen and Gotoh's position-conscious selection procedure, the transition from the usual cumulative 
voting to the proposed aggregation methods means the addition of a condition for respecting the 
minority opinions to the Pareto condition, and it may have a way to be compatible with the Pareto 
condition. Regarding the robustness against the conspiracy of the majority and the irrationality of 
voters, we believe that the visualization of the above-mentioned information and its use in the 
consensus-building process will provide an opportunity for adjustment and reflection. Regarding ease 
of use of the proposed methods, as examined through online opinion surveys and quadratic voting, a 
slider corresponding to the value axis and a button for adding/deleting points of cumulative voting 
will be provided in an online interface, so our methods can be used efficiently by displaying the 
above-mentioned visualization information. 
5. Conclusion 
To build consensus on pluralistic values, we proposed aggregation methods that take the minority's 
positionality on cardinal cumulative voting into account. These methods incorporate the idea of the 
position-conscious procedures on ordinal ranking by Sen and Gotoh for unfortunate people into 
cardinal cumulative voting that easily reflects the true opinions of voters. 
(1) To determine the advantages of our aggregation methods, a normal distribution was assumed as 
the true opinion distribution of voters, quadratic voting and linear voting were targeted as 
cumulative voting methods, and the aggregation results by weighting based on the positionality 
of minority were examined. 
(2) Specifically, three positionality-weighted methods Q-SW, Q-LW, and L- LW were formulated 
with the non-weighted quadratic voting method (Q-NW) and linear voting method (L-NW). These 
differ in whether the voting parameter based on the ratio of votes to cumulative points and the 
weighting parameter based on the ratio of all members to the minority follow a square-root or 
linear function. 
(3) By calculating the frequency distribution of the aggregated results using these methods, we found 
that minority opinions are more likely to be reflected in the order Q-SW, Q-LW, and L-LW as the 
voting and weighting parameters increase. Moreover, Q-LW and L-LW were found to reflect 
minority opinions proportionally. 
(4) This means that Sen and Gotoh's idea of considering the social position of unfortunate people in 
welfare economics was shown by weighting the minority's positionality. It will be useful for 
promoting mutual understanding between the majority and minority to using the weighted 
aggregation methods according to social positions and visualizing the aggregation content 
interactively in the consensus-building process. 
With the further development of information technology, integration of social systems and IT systems, 
as represented by the cyber-physical system, will progress. Therefore, analysis and simulation of 
social issues based on big data will be conducted, and consensus building on cardinal choices will be 
necessary. We would like to use the proposed aggregation methods for making social choices for 
pluralistic values such as social, environmental, and economic. 
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